United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

ORIGINAL

74-2478

BPUS

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

against

PETER BECKERMAN,

 $Defendant \hbox{-} Appellant.$

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOINT APPENDIX

Orans, Elsen & Poistein Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant One Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10020

Paul Curran United States Attorney Southern District of New York United States Court House Foley Square New York, New York 10007



PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

INDEX

	Page
Docket Entries	Al
Notice of Motion	A4
Affidavit of Robert Polstein in Support of Motion	A6
Exhibit AExcerpt from Trial Transcript	A18
Exhibit BExcerpts from Trial Transcript	A38
Exhibit CExcerpt from Trial Transcript	A43
Exhibit DJudge's Charge	A45
Judge Motley's Oral Decision	A73
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Indictment	A76



DOCKET ENTRIES

D. C. PALENTINGE OWE	TITLE OF	EAGE	./ -	12-04	ATTOMISYO	
THE	UNITED S	TATES		For U. S.:		
·					Figueroa	ATTEA
PETER SECK	ERMAN ·	٠٠٠, ٫٠٠		264-		ACUA
			•	•	0.00 9 1.2	,e.c.
•	•	•		For Defende		
					berr. Lag.	
		. 1		30 E.42p	1 St.	· .
Ī 			*2		N.Y.1000	07
•						
	T	·			:	
ABSTRACT OF COSTS	AMOUNT		CA8H RE		-	
(07) Fine.	+	DATE	mus		-	-
Clerk,	 	11/2/2	11/12	-/-		
Marchal,	1.000	17/1/30	·	11:02.7		1
Attorney,			1 18**			
XROOMINIONXXXINKK 21		**.**	Visit a Charles		7	-
OGN 39944812,841,(a)(1)	1	27.57	An egyptime			-
Distr. 6 possess, w/int						-
to distr. ScheduleII(Co:	caine)		•			
					4.	
(One Count)						
DATE			PROCEEDWIGE			
10-4-73 Filed indictment			•			
)-15-73 Deft (atty. pres	nt) Plead	e not m	11- 7-11		7.4	
Judge Notley for	all purp	OSES.	MacMahon	J	se assign	ned to
ov.15-73 Filed notion for di			,			· _
Nov.154-73 Filed notion for	44 20) 00000	electron:	c surveillance &	for pre-tr	al hearing	
Cov.15-70 Filed motion for d	isaver en	d tament	WY Proceedings			
-ov.15-7) Filed notice of mo	tion for hi	12 of name	i milama			
for 15-73 Filed brief in mup						

A 2

Docket Entries

	77 2	(er.	-	
-	PROCEEDINGS	~~~	***	-	-
1-15-73	Filed brief is support of motion for bill of particulars.				F
		43300			ł
1-15-73	Filed brief in support of motion for disclosure of electronic surv				İ
1-17-74	Filed Govt's notice of resdimess for trial				-
2-21-74	Filed order extending bail limits Mottley, J.		F		Ŧ
3-22-76	Filed affert, & motion of motion to suppress all evidence.		丰		ŧ
	BUT at defet a commenders of law				1
-77-11	Filed deft's memorandum of law.es				Į
-1h-Th	Filed Courte Ex 3.k.5. Ordered sealed & impoundedMotley, J.		33		1
5-8-76	JUNY TRIAL BEGUN Motley			-	-
5-9-70	Trial cont'd.		丰		-
5-20-74	Triel contid. Mistriel declared by Court Jury mable to agree To	A 77	rise		
£15-74	Filed Govt's requests to charge.	\vdash	+	+-	
	Filed Govt's supplemental request to charge.		丰	-	
5-15-79	Filed transcript of record of proceedings, dated May 7-74.	-	丰	\vdash	-
5-15-7h	Filed deft's requests to charme.	匚	Ŧ	\bot	
5-15-74	Filed Gorter menorandum of law in opposition to motion to inspect	1	+	+-	-
5-15-74	Filed affert.of Nicholas Figueros, AUDA in response to pre-trial	POLITOR		工	_
5-15-74	Filed deft's trial memorantum.	-	+	1	
5-15-76	Filed defter veir dires.		Ŧ	+	
5-16-7	Filed accorded M.O. Carer.AUSA is consection to superentian notice	-	Ŧ	1	
	Filed Notice of Reassignment to Over, 1.				

939

page 63

73 Cr.

7-10-74	PROCEEDINGS	T
	The Surrough of second of proceedings delot May 8,9,10, 1974,	- -
2-8-74	Filed transcript of record of proceedings dated Pay 6, 1974.	-
9-9-74	Tiled Deft's, sifficult and notice of notion for an order dismissing the indictment, ret, 9-20-74.	+
9-74	Tiled Defr's, meme, of law in support of motion to dismiss the indictment.	1
9-30-74	Filed Deft's, reply memorandum of law,	1
10-7-74	denving defa's, motion of appeal from the decision of Judge Motley, dated 9-27-74 denving defa's, motion to dismiss the indictment. Mailed notice to Peter Beckerman, 57 W. 58th St., N.Y.C. 10019 and U.S. Attorney's Office,	+
10-29-74	Filed transcript of record of proceedings dated 9-27-74.	7
0-30-74	Filed ORDER that for the reasons stated at the hearing held on 9-27-74, doft's. post-trial nation to dismiss the indicatent is denied	J.
11-7-74	Filed Consent OPDER extending beil limits to include the Eastern District of Few York: bail limits are further extended to include travel to the island of hassau in the Baheres for the period 11-27-74 to 12-8-74	1
	Piled deft's, smended notice of appeal from the order of Judge Motley filed on 10-30-74, hailed notice to Peter backgroun 57 W. 58th St. N.Y. C. 10019 and U.S. Attorney's Office.	+
		+
		+
		+
		+

Δ 4

NOTICE OF MOTION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

-against-

Docket No. 73 CR. 939 (RO)

PETER BECKERMAN,

NOTICE OF MOTION

Defendant.

SIRS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that upon the annexed affidavit of Robert Polstein, Esq. duly sworn to the 4th day of September, 1974, and upon the exhibits thereto and all other prior papers and proceedings heretofore had herein, the undersigned will move this Court before the Hon. Richard Owen, United States District Court Judge, at the United States Courthouse at Foley Square, New York, on the 16th day of September, 1974, at 10:00 p.m. in the forenoon or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard for an order dismissing the indictment against the defendant based upon the denial of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Dated: September 4, 1974

ORANS, ELSEN & POLSTEIN

Pohort Polot

Robert Polstein A Member of the Firm
One Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10020

212-586-2211

TO: HON. PAUL CURRAN
United States Attorney
Southern District of New York
United States Courthouse
Foley Square
New York, New York

CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT Southern District of New York United States Courthouse Foley Square New York, New York

Δ 6

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT POLSTEIN IN SUPPORT OF MCTION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT OF		
UNITED STATES OF AMER	ICA,	•
-against-	laintiff,	Docket No. 73 CR. 939 (RO)
PETER BECKERMAN,		AFFIDAVIT
	efendant.	
STATE OF NEW YORK)) ss.:)	

ROBERT POLSTEIN, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I am a member of Orans, Elsen & Polstein, attorneys for defendant, have been in charge of the defense of this indictment since we were retained, am fully familiar with all facts and prior proceedings herein, and submit this affidavit in support of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment because further prosecution would violate the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.

After a two-day trial of this simple, one-count indictment, the jury spent approximately four hours in actual deliberations before it was discharged by the Court as "deadlocked", over defense counsel's objections and despite a definite indication

from the jury that it lacked sufficient evidence to convict. The following excerpt from the trial transcript makes it crystal clear that, with additional time for deliberation, the jury might well have acquitted defendant (Exhibit A; 107:13-23):*

"THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen I have your note which reads 'We the jury are deadlocked.' Does that mean that you are not able to reach a verdict?

"THE FORELADY: It is very hard to say. We are all very tired at this time and our biggest problem is we don't think we have enough evidence and this is our biggest hassle and maybe another time, another day we may be clearer" (emphasis added).

We submit that, under those circumstances, the Court should not have precipitously discharged the jury, but should have granted defense counsel's request to charge the jury again as to burden of proof and sufficiency of evidence (108:12-20). Certainly, the jury clearly indicated that with a little more time an acquittal was probable, and we urge that to again force this defendant to go to trial on the same charge would constitute double jeopardy. Accordingly, this motion is brought to dismiss the indictment.

BACKGROUN

Peter Beckerman is a 25-year-old real estate broker who has never been convicted of a crime. A casual friend, one Mary

^{*} The entire transcript dealing with the jury's deliberations is annexed hereto as Exhibit "A", and is paginated inside the upper left-hand margin with the legend "rkrf 93" to "rkrf 112". In this affidavit, references to the transcript will be designated by page and line. Thus, the excerpt quoted above, cited "107:11-23" refers to page "rkrf 107, lines 11 through 23".

Adler had been telephoning defendant constantly for a week begging him to obtain some cocaine for her. On the evening of September 18, 1973, Beckerman went to Mary Adler's apartment with a small amount of cocaine. A federal undercover agent named Sam Meale was present and attempted to buy the cocaine from Beckerman. Defendant refused to sell it -- and, in fact, refused to let Meale touch, taste or smell the cocaine -- and left the apartment. Several blocks away he was arrested by Meale's partner.

Beckerman was subsequently indicted and charged with one count of possession with intent to sell approximately 28 grams of cocaine, in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. \$\$ 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).

On November 26, 1973, defendant's prior counsel made omnibus motions for pre-trial discovery and inspection (copies of which are on file with this Court). As part of those motions the defense requested the following information:

"5. All material known to the Government or which, through due diligence could be learned from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Government agencies or agents or prospective witnesses in this case which is arguably exculpatory material or favorable or useful to defendant, or which may lead to that exculpatory material, as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83. This material shall include, but not be limited to, statements of witnesses, criminal records of prospective Government witnesses, reference to informers relevant to a defense of entrapment, and character references laudatory to the accusad" (emphasis added).

On the same date, defense counsel moved for a bill of particulars, requesting the following information inter alia:

- "4. Specify the name or names of the person or persons to whom defendant is alleged to have distributed the above narcotic drug; (a) specify whether defendant is alleged to be acquainted with such person or persons; (b) specify whether such person or persons are agents or enforcements for the United States Government."
- "7. Specify whether an undercover agent or agents or informer or informers aided or participated in the investigation and/or arrest of defendant, and if so, set forth the name or names of such person or persons" (emphasis added).

In opposition to those motions, the Government submitted the affidavit of Assistant United States Attorney Figueroa (on file with this Court) in which it refused to reveal the identity of any "informers relevant to the defense of entrapment" and identified Special Agent Meale as the only Government agent involved (paragraphs "4" and "10" of Figueroa affidavit). The Court did not direct further particularization. Thus, after the conclusion of pre-trial skirmishing, the defense had no way of ascertaining that Mary Adler was — as it later developed — a paid Government informer.

After I was retained as defense counsel herein, I interviewed Mary Adler and discussed quite fully and frankly with her the elements of our entrapment defense. Obviously, I never would have been so open with her if I had any inkling that she was a Government informer. As was revealed during the course of the trial, Miss Adler subsequently met with the Assistant United

A 10

Affidavit of Robert Polstein

States Attorney in charge of the prosecution of this case and reported my conversation to him.

THE TRIAL

Immediately following the conclusion of a suppression hearing, this two-day trial commenced before Judge Motley, and the following evidence with respect to Mary Adler was adduced (see excerpts from trial transcript annexed hereto as Exhibit B; 31:8-14, 32:6-33:6, 46:18-47:2):

- "Q Is Mary Adler an informer for your bureau?

 THE WITNESS: Do I have to answer that?
- A Yes, she is.
- Q Does she have a number assigned to her by the Drug Enforcement Administration?
 - A Yes, she does.
 - Q What is Mary Adler's informer's number?"

* * *

"THE WITNESS: I believe I do. I might not recall it exactly. It's SC 10137 or 87.

- Q SC 1-30187?
- A Yes, I believe so.
- Q That's Mary Adler's number?
- A Yes.
- Q When did Mary Adler become an informer for the DEA?
 - A I personally don't know that.

Δ 11

Affidavit of Robert Polstein

- Q When did you meet Mary Adler for the first time?
- A I saw her approximately a week or two weeks prior to September 18th.
 - Q Who introduced you?
 - A Agent Lightcap.
 - Q Where did you meet Mary Adler?
- A I wasn't formally introduced to her until September 18th.
- Q But you met this young woman through your partner, Agent Lightcap; is that right?
 - A That is correct.
 - Q Did Lightcap tell you, 'This is Mary Adler'?
 - A Yes, he did.
- Q Did he tell you she was an informer for the DEA?
 - A Yes, he did.
- Q Did he tell you that she was trying to set up a cocaine deal for him?"

* * *

- "Q Do you know whether Mary Adler was being paid by the DEA for the service she was performing as an informer?
 - A I found out later that she was.
- Q She was being paid. And how did you find that out?
- A After the arrest of Peter Beckerman in discussing the case with Agent Lightcap. During this time is when I found out that the informant had been paid."

Obviously, under these circumstances, Mary Adler was a key prosecution witness. The trial prosecutor had Mary Adler actually present in the Court anteroom, but chose not to call her as a witness. I established this fact on trial by calling the case agent as the first defense witness (see Exhibit C; 213:24-214:8):

"Q Agent Lightcap, is Mary Adler presently in this building, to your knowledge?

A Yes, she is.

MR POLSTEIN: No further questions.

THE COURT: Do you have any cross examination?

MR. CAREY: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: You may come down.

(Witness excused. \"

Adler had entrapped defendant. Defendant testified in his own behalf at length. The Government did not call Mary Adler as a rebuttal witness.

Despite the brevity of the trial, Judge Motley charged the jury for one hour (see Judge's charge, Exhibit D annexed). During her instructions to the jury the Court charged that "There has been testimony with regard to the use of a person referred to as an informer or an informant and that was Mary Adler" (Exhibit D; 73:17-19), as to the Government's failure to call Mary Adler as a witnes. (Exhibit D; 74:12-22) and as to the entrapment defense (Exhibit D; 79:10-21; 85:23-88:23).

THE JURY'S DELIBERATIONS

The jury commenced deliberations at 2:30 p.m. (Exhibit A; 94;19). Forty-five minutes later, at 3:20 p.m., the jury sent in a note stating that they "would like to hear the Judge's charge in regard to Mary Adler" (Exhibit A; 95:24-96:3), and for the next 20 minutes, the Court repeated its instructions "with respect to Mary Adler" (Exhibit A; 99-102).

At 3:40 p.m. the jury again retired to resume its deliberations (Exhibit A; 103:3). A little less than two hours later, the jury requested to have testimony "in regard to phone calls to Mary Adler by Mr. Beckerman in Mary Adler's apartment" read (Exhibit A; 103:5-19). After completion of that rereading, the jury went to dinner at 6:30 p.m., and did not resume its deliberations until 8:00 p.m. (Exhibit A; 105:19-20).

Now, from the foregoing, it is patently evident that the jury was sorely troubled by the Government's failure to call Mary Adler as a witness and was having grave difficulties in finding that the Government had established its burden to prove the absence of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by the Court's charge. In this context, what transpired after the jury delivered its last note becomes even more meaningful.

At 9:15 p.m., the jury sent in a note reporting that it was "deadlocked" (Exhibit A; 105:21-106:5). As of that point -- exclusive of the rereading of the Court's charge and portions

Δ 14

Affidavit of Robert Polstein

of the testimony, and the dinner recess -- the jury had spent only four hours in actual deliberations.

The Government requested "that the Court give the jury a modified Allen charge", pointing out that, "they have only been deliberating a little over three hours" (Exhibit A; 106:6-15). The Court refused the Government's request, and brought in the jury, at which time the following colloquy occurred (Exhibit A; 107:13-108:21):

"THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen I have your note which reads 'We the jury are deadlocked'.

Does that mean that you are not able to reach a verdict, and the question I want to put to you whether you feel with a little more time you might be able to reach a verdict?

THE FORELADY: It is very hard to say. We are all very tired at this time and our biggest problem is we don't think we have enough evidence and this is our biggest hassle and maybe another time, another day we may be clearer.

THE COURT: The question I asked you was whether you thought with more time you would be able to reach a verdict, so the answer is no, is that it?

THE FORELADY: The way it seems now, it doesn't seem as though we will be able to.

MR. POLSTEIN: May I make a suggestion?

THE COURT: No, you may not.

Thank you very much. The court is going to declare a mistrial, the jury is excused.

We have arranged for a bus to take you home. Are they going to be here at 10:00 o'clock?

The jury is excused.

MR. POLSTEIN: Before the jury is excused, in view of the forelady's statement to the Court, I would respectfully request the Court to read the jury again your charge on burden of proof. I think that the foreman or forelady of the jury has expressed to the Court a view of the jury that can be cleared up. This jury has been out since 2:35. You just heard that they felt they don't have enough proof. I wonder if you would charge them again the quantum of proof.

THE COURT: The jury is dismissed."

We submit that when the forelady stated in open court that, "Our biggest problem is we don't think we have enough evidence" this was tantamount to an announcement that the Government has failed to sustain its burden of proof. Just as obviously, when the forelady stated that, "maybe another time, another day we may be clearer", the jury was asking for additional time to deliberate. At that point, it was evident that if the Court repeated its instructions with regard to "burden of proof" and "reasonable doubt" an acquittal would probably have resulted. I made such a request. The Court refused my request, the jury was summarily discharged and a mistrial was declared by the Court on its own volition.

As is pointed out in our accompanying memorandum of law, a trial court may not arbitrarily dismiss a jury in the absence of very extraordinary and stringent circumstances clearly demonstrating that it is hopelessly deadlocked. Clearly no such circumstances existed here. Despite the forelady's unequivocal statement that "maybe another time, another day we may be clearer"

Δ 16

Affidavit of Robert Polstein

the Court decided <u>sua sponte</u> that this july was incapable of reaching a decision. Judge Motley's own explanation of why she discharged the jury is at variance with the forelady's statement (Exhibit A; 109:20-23):

"The forelady was plainly asked with a little more time would they be able to reach a verdict and she was intending to say they couldn't but I think went a little beyond that" (emphasis added).

The hour was not late, buses were already standing by (Exhibit A; 108:9-10), and certainly some additional time could have been granted to the jury to continue its deliberations. The jury, by its notes to the Court, had telegraphed that it was sorely troubled by the Government's failure to call Mary Adler as a witness. Now, upon a retrial, the Government could cure this defect in its case. Under the circumstances, to subject defendant to another trial would be manifestly unfair.

In short, the Government took the chance that it could overcome defendant's entrapment defense in the absence of Mary Adler as a rebuttal witness. The witness was present in court, yet the prosecution chose not to call her to the stand. Having gambled and lost, the Government should not now be given another opportunity to attempt to convict this defendant upon the same charges.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and pursuant to the decisional law set forth in our accompanying memorandum of law, it is

A 17

Affidavit of Robert Polstein

respectfully submitted that to subject this defendant to another trial upon this same charge would constitute double jeopardy and, accordingly, the indictment herein should be dismissed.

ROBERT POLSTEIN

Sworn to before me this 4th day of September, 1974

ABIGAIL A. REESE
Hotory Public, State of New York
No. 21-4802054
Qualified in New York County
Commission Expires March 29, 1475

EXHIBIT A--EXCERPT FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPT ANNEXED TO
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT POLSTEIN
rkrf 93

the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such inducement was not the cause or creator of the crime.

That is, the Government must prove that defendant had been predisposed and so forth.

Anything else?

MR. FERRARA: We respectfully except to that portion of the charge.

THE COURT: All right.

(In open court.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, when you go in the jury room, you can send for any of the exhibits you would like to see or have any of the testimony read back.

I want to caution you that you are not to reveal the standing of the jurors, that is, the split of the vote, if that should occur at any time to anyone, not even to the Court and of course you should communicate with no one except by handing a note to the marshals who will be in attendance.

If you want to say anything to anybody, give a note to the marshal and he will give it to me.

agreed to excusing Mr. Schechner. Mr. Schechner pointed out earlier today that he is an orthodox Jew and he would

A 19

	Exhibit A
1	rkrf 94
2	like to return to his home to prepare for his religious
3	services tonight so we are going to excuse Mr. Schechner
4	now and substitute Alternate Juror No. 1, Mrs. Louise Reed.
5	Mr. Schechner, do you have anything in the jury
6	room?
7	MR. SCHECHNER: Yes, a hat and a raincoat.
8	THE COURT: Would you get that?
9	MR. SCHECHNER: I want to extend my appreciation
10	to the Court and counsel and the jurors for a very education
11	experience.
12	THE COURT: Thank you very much and I want to
13	thank you again for your service on this jury.
4	You are excused.
5	THE COURT: Mrs. Reed, would you move into Juror
6	No. 7's seat.
7	Would the clerk please swear the marshal.
8	(Marshal sworn.) .
9	(Jury commenced deliberations at 2:35 p.m.)
0	
,	

Exhibit A

	Exhibit A
1	rkrf 95
2	THE COURT: Gentlemen, I want to say this. You
3	are not to leave this floor because if the jurors send out
4	a note, we don't want to be running around the courthouse
5	trying to find you and the condition of the elevators does
6	not permit you to be running up and down.
7	MR. POLSTEIN: I suggested to Mr. Carey we agree
8	upon the exhibits and leave them in one place.
9	THE COURT: There are not that many. There are
10	only four.
11	MR. CAREY: Four Government, your Honor.
12	MR. POLSTEIN: We just have three. The clothes,
13	the real estate license and the telephone toll charges.
14	THE COURT: Hold on to each of your own exhibits
15	and if they send for them, we will get them.
16	(Recess.)
17	(3:20 p.m., a note was received from the jury.)
18	(In open court.)
19	(In the robing room.)
20	THE COURT: We have a note from the jurors which
21	will be marked Court's Exhibit 8.
22	(Court's Exhibit 8 marked for
23	identification.)
24	THE COURT: "Jury would like to hear the testimo

of Mr. Lightcap in regard to the surveillance of Peter

Exhibit A

rkrf 96

Beckerman before September 18, 1973. Also jury would like to hear the Judge's charge in regard to Mary Adler, Beverly Whittesley, foreman."

I don't know what they mean by the charge in regard to Mary Adler except the entrapment charge.

MR. POLSTEIN: I would assume that is what they mean.

THE COURT: That is the only time I gather that I mentioned her name in actually reading the charge.

I think in the beginning. In the beginning where I gave the essence of the defendant's claims, I just said Government's agents and what the claim was and in the entrapment charge I mentioned Mary Adler.

MR. CAREY: I believe you also mentioned Mary
Adler in connection with your charge on the availability
of witnesses, stating that the jury can take no inference
for or against the Government or for or against the defendant
as a result of either parties failure to call Miss Adler.

THE COURT: I can say to the jurors I mentioned her in connection with the entrapment charge and the failure to call a witness charge. Which of those do you have in mind?

MR. CAREY: I would request that both of those be read.

rkrf 97

call

MR. POLSTEIN: I think the Judge has to inquire of the jury because she can't volunteer anything unless they ask.

THE COURT: I think we should have it clarified because I mentioned her specifically when I came to the failure, there had been a lot of talk about the Government's failure to call the informant Mary Adler and then defendant claims he was entrapped by Mary Adler and other Government agents.

MR. CAREY: Your Honor, it is my recollection there is no testimony of surveillance of the defendant by Agent Lightcap prior to September 18th.

THE COURT: They do use the word surveillance.

Do you recall any such testimony?

MR. POLSTEIN: I had asked him was there any surveillance. I believe he said not before that night, but in that connection he mentioned his three conversations with Mary Adler.

THE COURT: Yes. That is what I had thought they had in mind.

MR. POLSTEIN: I was trying to pin him down to dates, knowing full well that Peter was in Boston at the time.

THE COURT: I will have to ask them about that,

1 | rkrf 98

too, then.

(In open court, jury present.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I have your note which reads as follows:

"Jury would like to hear the testimony of Mr. Lightcap in regard to the surveillance of Peter Beckerman before September 18, 1973."

There is no testimony regarding surveillance of Peter Beckerman before September 18th. There is testimony regarding conversations I believe with Mary Adler about Peter Beckerman before that time.

You will have to let me know whether that is what you have in mind, whether you are talking about surveillance? Surveillance means following a person and the person doesn't know he is being watched.

Is that what you had in mind?

THE FORELADY: We'thought there was some testimony of that fact that Peter Beckerman had been under surveillance for a day or two before September 18th. Maybe it was by the other agent.

THE COURT: I think the agent was asked and he said he was not under surveillance and that is what we mean by surveillance, where an agent follows a person who looks at what he does for a day or so. I think the

Exhibit A

1 rkrf 99

2.

agent was asked whether he had Beckerman under surveillance but he answered no. There was testimony, I believe, with regard to his talking, one of them talking to Mary Adler before.

The next part of your note reads, "Jury would like to hear the Judge's charge in regard to Mary Adler."

Now, I mentioned Mary Adler twice. The first time with respect to the Government's failure to call her. The law with respect to failure to call a witness.

Then I mentioned Mary Adler with respect to the law of entrapment. Which of those two did you want read?

(Jurors say "Both."

a great deal of discussion about the Government's failure to call Mary Adler as a witness and as I told you, the law is that if the Government has failed to call a witness who is equally available to both sides, you may not draw an inference that his or her testimony would have been unfavorable to the Government.

There is no presumption against the Government from its failure to call a witness if it should appear to you that their testimony would be merely cumulative or repetitive and have no greater value than that of witnesses who have testified.

rkrf 100

The law does not impose upon a defendant the duty to call as witnesses any persons who are shown to have been present at any of the events involved in the evidence, or who may appear to have some knowledge of the matters in question.

Both sides have the right to interview witnesses at any time before or during the trial.

Then with respect to entrapment, you recall that I said it was defendant's defense here that he had been entrapped by Mary Adler and other Government agents into committing the crime and therefore I must instruct you as to the law regarding entrapment and I pointed out that the word entrapment has a legal meaning, a technical meaning, not that of popular speech or colloquial ordinary. usage.

Criminal activity is such that sometimes stealth and strategy are necessary methods to be used by law enforcement officers. The function of law enforcement is not only the prevention of crime, but also the detection and apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of crime by Government agents.

The defense of entrapment is based upon the policy of the law not to ensuare or entrap innocent persons into

Exhibit A

rkrf 101

the commission of a crime, but a line must be drawn between the entrapment of the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal. A basic feature of entrapment is, that the idea or design of committing a crime originated with a law enforcement officer or Government informer rather than with a defendant. That a defendant had no predisposition, intent or purpose to commit the alleged offense and that the law enforcement officer or Government employee implanted in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and instigated and incited its commission in order that the defendant might be arrested and prosecuted.

If you find that an agent or employee of the Government merely afforded a favorable opportunity to the defendant for the commission of the alleged crime, such conduct on the part of the Government does not constitute entrapment. Entrapment would only occur if you find that the Government t agent induced the defendant to commit the crime charged in the indictment and that the criminal conduct of the defendant was a product of the Government's activity.

If the jury finds any credible evidence creating the reasonable possibility that a Government agent or employee instigated and incited or otherwise induced the

Exhibit A

rkrf 102

the defendant to commit the crime charged, then the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such inducement was not the cause or creator of the crime. That is, the Government must prove that the defendant had been predisposed and willing to commit the crime.

In other words, the same thought, while a defendant is not required to prove his entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, the Government must prove its absence beyond a reasonable doubt and if you have a reasonable doubt as to the absence of entrapment and find a reasonable possibility of entrapment, you must acquit the defendant.

If the prosecution has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was ready and willing to commit the offense charged and was merely awaiting a favorable opportunity to commit the offense, then you may find that the inducement, if any, which brought about the actual offense was no more than the providing of what appeared to the defendant to be a favorable or timely or convenient opening for the criminal activity in which that defendant engaged.

In such circumstances, you may find that the Government's agent has not seduced an innocent person, but has only provided the means for the defendant to effectuate or realize his own then existing purpose.

	A 28
1	rkrf 103 Exhibit A
2	You may return to the jury room.
3	(Jury leaves room at 3:40 p.m.)
4	(Recess.)
5	(5:35 p.m., note received from the jury.)
6	(In open court.)
7	THE COURT: We have a note from the jury. It wil
8	be marked Court's Exhibit 9.
9	(Court's Exhibit 9 marked for
10	identification.)
11	THE COURT: Gentlemen, we have a note from the
12	jurors which has been marked Court's Exhibit 9 and reads
13	as follows:
14	"We would like to hear the testimony by Mr.
15	Lightcap and Mr. Meale in regard to phone calls to Mary
16	Adler by Mr. Beckerman in Mary Adler's apartment, what was
17	said and what time the calls were made on September 18th,"
18	and I guess that is substantially the testimony of
19	Lightcap well, Meale, I guess it is.
20	MR. POLSTEIN: Both.
21	THE COURT: Were there calls made while Lightcap
22	was there?
23	MR. POLSTEIN: Yes.
24	THE COURT: The reporter will have to-find
25	that.

Also the te. timony of Peter Beckerman with regard

:x

rkrf 104

to the calls he received from Mary Adler on September

18th in his office, what was said and what time the calls
were made and testimony by Miss Burns in regard to the
time Mary Adler called Peter Beckerman in his office.

Would you swear in the new marshals.

(Marshals sworn.)

(Pause.)

MR. CAREY: If there is a question which is objected to and the question is sustained, will the reporter read that question?

THE COURT: No. They know that.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we have your note which was marked Court's Exhibit 9 which reads as follows:

"Would like to hear the testimony of Mr. Lightcap and Mr. Meale in regard to phone calls to Mary Adler by Mr. Beckerman in Mary Adler's apartment, what was said, what time the calls were made on September 18th. Also the testimony of Mr. Peter Beckerman in regard to the calls he received from Mary Adler on September 18th at his office, what was said and what time the calls were made and testimony by Miss Burns in regard to the time that Mary Adler called Peter Beckerman in his office."

Exhibit A

1	rkrf 105
2	The reporter has taken the time to find that
3	testimony and he will now read it.
4	(Testimony read.)
5	The reporter that is going to read
6	this hasn't taken the early part, it was taken by another
7	reporter so he may have to pause as he goes along while he
8	reads somebody else's notes.
9	(Testimony read.)
10	THE COURT: You may return to the jury room,
11	ladies and gentlemen.
12	THE COURT: I gather the jurors will be going to
13	dinner in ten minutes .
14	MR. POLSTEIN: May we know where they are going
15	so we can avoid that restaurant?
16	THE COURT: We will find out in a few minutes.
17	THE COURT: The jury is going to Aldo's.
18	(Recess.)
19	(At 6:30 p.m., an evening recess was taken.)
20	(Jury resumed its deliberations at 8:00 p.m.)
21	(9:15 p.m., a note was received from the jury.)
22	(In open court.)
23	THE COURT: Gentlemen, we have a note from the
24	jury. We will mark it Court's Exhibit 10.

(Court's Exhibit 10 marked for

25

	A 31
1	rkrf 106
2	identification.)
•	
3	THE COURT: The note reads as follows:
4	"We the jury are deadlocked," which I gather
5	means they can't reach a verdict so we will bring them in.
6	MR. CAREY: Your Honor, the Government would
7	request that the Court give the jury a modified
8	Allen charge.
9	THE COURT: I don't know what a modified Allen
10	charge is. You mean the Allen charge?
11	MR. CAREY: Yes.
12	THE COURT: I think the jury has indicated that
13	they are deadlocked.
14	MR. CAREY: They have only been deliberating
15	a little over three hours.
16	THE COURT: Three hours? The jury went out at 2:3
17	It is now 9:25.
18	MR. CAREY: Your HOnor, I am not counting the
19	time when they were in the courtroom. I am counting the
20	time when they were in their jury room when they were out
21	of the presence
22	THE COURT: We reread a great deal of the record

to them. I have reread the charge on entrapment to them and I read the Government's failure to call a witness and the significance of that and the rereading of that

23

24

25

Exhibit A

rkrf 107

testimony took at least 50 minutes. You have to count that as part of their deliberations. I don't think it is fair to say they weren't deliberations. We were rereading testimony which is part of their deliberations. We were rereading a part of the charge.

This says they are deadlocked and it is a one count case.

MR. CAREY: I have nothing further to say, your Honor.

THE COURT: Bring in the jury.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen I have your note which reads "We the jury are deadlocked."

Does that mean that you are not able to reach a verdict, and the question I want to put to you whether you feel with a little more time you might be able to reach a verdict?

THE FORELADY: It is very hard to say. We are all very tired at this time and our biggest problem is we don't think we have enough evidence and this is our biggest hassle and maybe another time, another day we may be clearer.

THE COURT: The question I asked you was whether you thought with more time you would be able to reach

1	
2	

rkrf 108

a verdict, so the answer is no, is that it?

THEFORELADY: The way it seems now, it doesn't seem as though we will be able to.

MR. POLSTEIN: May I make a suggestion?
THE COURT: No, you may not.

Thank you very much. The court is going to declare a mistrial, the jury is excused.

We have arranged for a bus to take you home.

Are they going to be here at 10:00 o'clock?

The jury is excused.

MR. POLSTEIN: Before the jury is excused, in view of the forelady's statement to the Court, I would respectfully request the Court to read the jury again your charge on burden of proof. I think that the foreman or forelady of the jury has expressed to the Court a view of the jury that can be cleared up. This jury has been out since 2:35. You just heard'that they felt they don't have enough proof. I wonder if you would charge them again the quantum of proof.

THE COURT: The jury is dismissed.

(Jury leaves courtroom.)

MR. POLSTEIN: Is there a prohibition by my talking to the jury?

MR. CAREY: That was my question also. I

Exhibit A

rkrf 109

understand it is permissible to speak to the jury at this time.

THE COURT: I usually say the thing to do is not to speak to the jury. I don't know if they want to be bothered by lawyers speaking to them.

MR. CAREY: If we ask them and they consent to speak to us, will that be acceptable to your Honor?

THE COURT: As I have said, I don't want to encourage that kind of thing, but it seems to me as I have said, the jury sent out this note saying that they were deadlocked. I asked the forelady of the jury whether with a little more time of course they could reach a verdict. Instead of answering that question, she went on to tell us what their deliberations were and that of cours should not have been done so in that case, I think it was proper to dismiss the jury for a mistrial anyway because they revealed the problems of the jury which I don't believe was the proper thing.

The forelady was plainly asked with a little more time would they be able to reach a verdict and she was intending to say they couldn't but I think went a little beyond that.

MR. POLSTEIN: If your Honor pleases, at this time the defense renews its motion for a directed verdict

of acquittal.

As your Honor charged the jury and charged the jury accurately, once the defense adduced some proof of entrapment, the burden was then on the Government to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not induced by the action of the agent provocateur. I think that the proof in this case has been clear. There was no rebuttal witness. Under the circumstances, I submit as a matter of law, the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict.

THE COURT: I will have to take a few moments to consider your motion.

(Recess.)

THE COURT: I think that the problem with your motion, Mr. Polstein, is that you made a motion at the end of the Government's case for a directed verdict of acquittal which I denied on the ground that there was evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty and that was the test announced by the Second Circuit in United States against Taylor 464 F 2nd 240, 1972.

In that case the Court announced the test for determining whether a case should go to the jury and in that case the Court said that if the evidence is such

that reasonable jurymen must necessarily have a reasonable doubt, the Judge must require an acquittal but if a reasonable mind might fairly have a reasonable doubt or might fairly not have one, the case is for the jury.

In this case we had two agents testifying as to what occurred that night on September 18th so there was evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty.

Of course, in the case you also had the problem of the Government not having called Miss Adler which might be said to be evidence from which reasonable men might have a reasonable doubt, so we had both of those problems in this case, but as I have indicated, there was evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty.

The case properly went to the jury, and then we got the note, Court's Exhibit 10 which the jury said, "We the jury are deadlocked."

I asked the forelady whether she thought with a little more time they could reach a verdict and of course she went too far but certainly the essence of it was, they could not.

So, the motion is denied and a mistrial as I say has been granted. We will have to set a date for a new

hibit A

	Δ 37
	Exhibit A
1	rkrf 112
2	trial.
3	MR. POLSTEIN: I assume the bail conditions are
4	continued.
5	MR. CAREY: Mr. Polstein made a request that
6	the bail conditions be continued. The Government would con-
7	sent to that request.
8	THE COURT: All right.
9	(Adjourned.)
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	

A 38

	EXHIBIT BEXCERPTS FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPT ANNEXED TO AFFIDAVIT (F ROBERT POLSTEIN
1	dhrf Meale - cross 31
2	A Yes, we do.
3	Q Do you assign numbers to those informers?
4	A Yes, we do.
5	Q The Drug Enforcement Administration has a list
6	of informers and they are all given numbers?
7	A Yes.
8	Q Is Mary Adler an informer for your bureau?
9	THE WITNESS: Do I have to answer that?
10	A Yes, she is.
11	Q Does she have a number assigned to her by the
12	Drug Enforcement Administration?
13	A Yes, she does.
14	Q What is Mary Adler's informer's number?
15	MR. CAREY: Your Honor, if the witness knows,
16	your Honor, I have no objection.
17	A I
18	MR. POLSTEIN: Thank you, Mr. Carey.
19	THE COURT: What is the relevance anyway of a
20	number? A number has what relevance, Mr. Polstein? He's
21	testified that Mary Adler was an informer for the Drug
22	Enforcement Administration. What relevance is it as
23	what her Government informer number is?
24	MR. POLSTEIN: Because document No. 3506 that Mr.

Garay so kindly turned over to me a few moments ago refers

25

Exhibit B

1	dhrf Meale - cross 32
2	to a number and I want to find out is that Mary Adler.
3	This is this man's report.
4	THE COURT: All right.
5	Do you know the number?
6	THE WITNESS: I believe I do. I might not recall
7	it exactly. It's SC 10137 or 87.
8	Q SC 1-30187?
9	A Yes, I believe so.
10	Q That's Mary Adler's number?
11	A Yes.
12	Q When did Mary Adler become an informer for the
13	DEA?
14	Λ I personally don't know that.
15	Q When did you meet Mary Adler for the first time?
16	A I saw her approximately a week or two weeks .
17	prior to September 18th.
18	Q Who introduced you?
19	A Agent Lightcap.
20	O Where did you meet Mary Adler?
21	A I wasn't formally introduced to her until
22	September 18th.
23	Q But you met this young woman through your
24	partner, Agent Lightcap; is that right?
25	A That'is correct.

Exhibit B

1	dhrf	Meale - cross 33
2	Q	Did Lightcap tell you, "This is Mary Adler"?
3	A	Yes, he did.
4	Q -	Did he tell you she was an informer for
5	the DEA?	
6	A	Yes, he did.
7	Q	Did he tell you that she was trying to set up
8	a cocaine	deal for him?
9		MR. CAREY: Objection, your Honor.
10		THE COURT: Yes, that calls for a conclusion
11	on the pa	rt of the witness.
12		MR. POLSTEIN: No, ma'am. I asked what Agent
13	Lightcap	told him.
14		THE COURT: Well, that's a good question. Ask
15	him what	Agent Lightcap told him.
16		MR. CAREY: Your Honor, I object on the ground
17	of hearsa	y.
18		THE COURT: Well, 'Agent Lightcap's going to be
19	here, isn	't he, to be cross examined and testify?
20		MR. CAREY: Yes, your Honor.
21	Q	You met Mary Adler at any rate through Agent
22	Lightcap?	
23	· A	Yes.
24	Ó	Is that right?
25	A	Yes, I did.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

You are stating now that regardless of what you said in the grand jury October 4th of last year it is your sworn testimony now that Mary Adler received two in-coming calls while you were at that apartment that evening before Beckerman showed up?

- A That is correct.
- Q I'm sorry.
- A That is correct.
- Q And is that testimony just as truthful as all the other testimony you have given so far?
 - A Yes, it is.

MR. POLSTEIN: I don't know if I have made thisclear. I've been using the initials DEA and whenever I use them, your Honor, I'm intending to refer to the Drug Enforcement Administration. I trust the jury uncerstands that.

- O Do you know whether Mary Adler was being paid by the DEA for the service she was performing as an informer?
 - A I found out later that she was.
- O She was being naid. And how did you find that out?
- A After the arrest of Peter Beckerman in discussing the case with Agent Lightcap. During this time is when

A 42

Exhibit B

1	dhrf	Meale - cr	055	47
2	I found	out that the informa	nt had been pai	d.
3	Q	Now, Mr. Meale, is	n't it a fact t	hat the very
4	first ti	me you heard Peter B	eckerman's name	was that night,
5	Sentembe	r 18th?		
6	A	No, it is not.		
7	ó	Had Agent Lightcap	and you discus	sed this
8	investig	ation?		
9	. A	The name		
10	ó	You can answer tha	t yes or no. II	ad you discussed
11	this inv	estigation?		
12	Α	I can't I have	to quarrel with	that because I
13	was told	about the investig	ation the night	of the 18th.
14	Ó	By whom?		
15	Λ	By Agent Lightcap.		
16	ú	So it was Agent Li	ghtcap's continu	uing investiga-
17	tion, in	other words, and yo	u got into it or	n the night
13	of the a	ctual arrest?		
19	A	Yes, that is corre	ct.	
20	Q	All right. Fine.	I will save out	estions on
21	that the	n for Agent Lightcap		
2.2		Now, I'm referring	you back to who	en you were
23	at the a	partment. Both of t	nese phone call:	s, you say,
84	came int	o the apartment befo	re Mr. Beckerman	arrived?
25	A A	That is correct.		

A 43

EXHIBIT C--EXCERPT FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPT ANNEXED TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT POLSTEIN

1 rkrf 213

the contacts to get Peter Beckerman into this anartment contends that Mr. Beckerman invited the contacts which were subsequently made by Mary Adler or between Mary Adler and Mr. Beckerman.

THE COURT: Yes, that goes to whether he was predisposed, whether there was any evidence he was predisposed.

Anything else?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. CAREY: Nothing.

THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed?

MR. POLSTEIN: Yes. I will call Agent Lightcan as my first witness.

(Jury present.)

THE COURT: I believe the clerk has gone to get the defendant's first witness.

The Government having rested, we will now proceed with the defendant's case.

MR. POLSTEIN: I call Agent Lightcap.

Dy the defense, having been previously duly sworn, testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. POLSTEIN:

Q Agent Lightcap, is Mary Adler presently in this

Δ 44

Exhibit C

1	rkrf Lightcap - direct 214	
2	building, to your knowledge?	
3	A Yes, she is.	
4	MR. POLSTEIN: No further questions.	
5	THE COURT: Do you have any cross examination?	
6	MR. CAREY: No, your Honor.	
7	THE COURT: You may come down.	
8	(Witness excused.)	
9	MR. POLSTEIN: Linda Burns	
10	LINDA BURNS, a witness called by	
11	defendant, being first duly sworn, testified as	
12	follows:	
13	DIRECT EXAMINATION	
14	BY MR. POLSTEIN:	
15	O Miss Burns, where were you born?	
16	A London, England.	
17	Q Are you a citizen of this country?	
18	A No, resident.	
19	Q You realize you are about to give testimony	
20	under oath?	
21	A Yes.	
22	O If you testified falsely, that would subject you	
23	to deportation proceedings?	
24	A Yes.	
25	O Do you know the defendant Peter Beckerman?	

EXHIBIT D--JUDGE'S CHARGE ANNEXED TO AFFIDAVIT
rkrf pm 63

OF ROBERT POLSTEIN

AFTERNOON SESSION

1:30 p.m.

(In open court, jury present.)

CHARGE OF THE COURT

want to thank you for your patience and for your cooperation in being prompt. I know that in order to serve on this jury, each of you has had to make some personal or business sacrifice in order to do so, but you may recall when the trial commenced, I reminded you that we all have a stake in the fair and impartial administration of justice, so that I am sure any business or personal sacrifice that you have had to make in order to be here, you were glad to do so in the interest of the fair and impartial administration of justice.

Before formally beginning the charge, I would like to thank counsel and both sides for their patience with the Court and to congratulate each of them on the high degree of professional skill that each has demonstrated throughout this trial.

Now, I trust that you will bear with me, ladies and gentlemen and give me that same degree of attention which you have given throughout the trial so that you may carefully understand the legal principles which you

are to apply to the facts in this case as you find them.

As you approach the performance of your function in this case which is to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant who is on trial, I want to remind you that it is your duty to weigh the evidence calmly and dispassionately without sympathy or prejudice for or against either the defendant or the Government in this case.

Every defendant appearing before the Court is entitled to a fair and impartial trial regardless of his occupation or station in life.

The fact that the case is brought by the Government here, that is, that the action is entitled The United States of America versus Peter Beckerman, entitles the Government to no greater consideration than that accorded to any other litigant in a lawsuit. By the same token, it is entitled to no less consideration than any other litigant in a lawsuit. That is to say, all parties, Government and individuals alike stand equal before the law.

There is only one charge made in the indictment in this case and your verdict as to that charge must be either guilty or not guilty, and that verdict must be based solely upon the evidence presented in this case and as I told you before the evidence in the case, it is the testimony that you heard from the witnesses who took the witness stand,

l | rkrf 65

any exhibits actually received in evidence and any stipulations as to certain facts which the lawyers may have entered into.

You as jurors are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. That means that you pass upon the weight of the evidence. You determine the credibility of the witnesses. That is, you determine who is telling the truth and who is not and who has given you the correct picture of exactly what occurred here. As tryers of the fact, you resolve such conflicts as there may be in the evidence or in the testimony and you as the tryers of the fact draw such reasonable inferences as may be warranted by the testimony or other evidence in the case.

Again, with respect to any matter of fact, it is your recollection and yours alone that governs. Anything that counsel for the Government may have said or anything that counsel for the defendant may have said with respect to any matter of fact, whether stated in their opening statement, during the course of the trial or in the summations which you have just heard, is not to be substituted by you in lieu of your own independent recollection of what the evidence shows.

So too, anything that the Court may have said during the course of the trial or may refer to during these

¢.

instructions, that is, any matter of fact, is not to be substituted by you in lieu of your own recollection as to what the facts are.

The fact that I refer to some of the testimony during the course of these instructions does not mean that I think that that is the only testimony you should consider, or the most important.

In deciding the guilt or innocence of this defendant, you should consider all the testimony, both direct and cross examination and you must consider the contentions of both parties as set forth in the summations which you have just heard.

My function is to instruct you as to the law and you should accept the law as I state it to you in these instructions and apply it to the facts as you find them.

Now, the logical result of that application is a verdict in the case and I want to caution you that you are not to single out any one instruction alone as stating the law, but you must consider these instructions as a whole.

You are not to assume that I have any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of this defendant or the truth or falsity of the charges. That is for the jury to determine. The fact that I have denied motions

or granted motions in the course of the trial is not to be taken by you as any indication that the defendant is believed by the Court to be guilty or innocent. These motions are matters of law with which you as jurors have no concern.

If during the course of the trial a question was asked and an objection interposed and I sustained the objection, you are to disregard the question and any alleged facts contained in that question.

Similarly, if I ruled that an answer be stricken from the record, you are to disregard both the question and the answer in your deliberations.

Now, you remember when the trial commenced I told you that in a criminal case, the Government has the burden of proof and that is to prove the defendant guilty of a charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

I want to tell you what is meant by the term reasonable doubt. Placing the burden on the Government of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt means that the Government has a burden which never shifts. It remains upon the Government throughout the entire trial. As I told you before, in a criminal case a defendant does not have to prove his innocence. On the contrary, he is presumed to be innocent of the accusations

contained in an indictment.

This presumption of innocence was in his favor at the start of the trial, remains in his favor throughout the trial, is in his favor even as I instruct you now. It remains in his favor even when you retire to the jury room to deliberate.

Now, the presumption of innocence is removed only if and when the jury, after its deliberations, is convinced that the Government has sustained its burden of proof. That is to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The question which naturally comes up is, what is a reasonable doubt? The words almost define themselves.

Reasonable doubt is a doubt founded in reason and arising out of the evidence in the case or the lack of evidence.

It is a doubt which a reasonable person has after carefully weighing all the evidence.

The kind of doubt which would make one hesitate to act. It means a doubt which is substantial and not merely shadowy.

Reasonable doubt is one which appeals to your reason and your judgment and your common sense and your experiences in life. It is not caprice, whim or speculation. It is not an excuse to avoid the performance of an unpleasant

duty. It is not sympathy for a defendant.

If after a fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence you can candidly and honestly say that you are not satisfied of the guilt of this defendant and that you do not have an abiding conviction as to this defendant's guilt, such a conviction as you would be willing to act upon unhesitatingly in importance and weighty matters in the personal affairs of your own life, then you have a reasonable doubt and in that circumstance, it is your duty to acquit the defendant.

On the other hand, if after such a fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence you can candidly and honestly say that you are satisfied of the guilt of this defendant, that you do have an abiding conviction as to this defendant's guilt, such a conviction as you would be willing to act upon unhesitatingly in important and weighty matters in the personal affairs of your own life, then you have no reasonable doubt and in that circumstance, you may convict this defendant.

Now, a reasonable doubt does not mean a positive certainty or beyond all possible doubt. It is practically impossible for a person to be absolutely and completely convinced of any controverted fact, which by its nature is not susceptible to mathematical certainty.

In consequence, the law in a criminal case is, it is sufficient if the quilt of a defendant is established beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond all possible doubt.

Now, I want to tell you about how you determine the credibility of the witnesses who have testified here before you. You know, of course, there is no automatic way to decide who is telling the truth and who is not.

Credibility can be equated with believability and reliability

If a witness is credible, you say he is believable and reliable. If he is incredible, you say he is unbelievable. There is nothing mysterious about these words.

Now, by what yardstick are you to judge the credibility of the witnesses? Each of you has given careful attention to the testimony as it came from the witnesses themselves. You observed the witnesses. They were sitting right here before you.

Issues of fact are presented for your determination and to a large extent, the resolution of them depends upon the credibility of the witnesses and the support or lack of support they receive from other evidence in the case.

Your duty is to decide the issues of fact.

An issue of fact is presented, for example, when one

witness testifies that a certain event occurred and another witness testifies that it did not occur.

Now, the thing for you to do, is to use your logic, your reason and your common sense, and don't be side-tracked or diverted or distracted by what you consider to be a minor or insignificant detail or irrelevancy, or by what you consider to be an appeal not to your reason or logic but to mere sentimentality, or unthinking passion.

I repeat, use your common sense. You should carefully scrutinize all the testimony given, both the direct and cross examination. The circumstances under which each witness has testified and every matter in evidence which tends to show whether the witness is worthy of belief.

Consider each witness' intelligence, motive and state of mind and demeanor and manner while on the witness stand. Consider each witness' ability to observe the matters as to which he has testified and whether he impresses you as having an accurate recollection of these things.

Consider also any relation each witness may bear to either side of the case. The manner in which each witness might be affected by the verdict and extent to which if at all each witness is either supported or

contradicted by other evidence in the case.

Inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness or between the testimony of different witnesses may or may not cause the jury to discredit such testimony. Two or more persons witnessing an incident or transaction may see or hear it differently an innocent misrecollection, like failure of recollection is not an uncommon experience.

In weighing the effect of a discrepancy, always consider whether it pertains to a matter of importance or an unimportant detail and whether the discrepancy results from innocent error, or intentional falsehood.

In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of any witness, you should also consider the testimony of the different witnesses. The mere fact that they are employees of the Government entitles them to no more and no less consideration than any other witness, nor should you be influenced by the number of witnesses a side has called or the number of exhibits received in evidence.

It is the quality of the testimony and other evidence which counts, not the quantity. After making your judgment, you will give the testimony of each witness such credibility if any as you think it deserves.

If you find that any witness, and this applies

to all witnesses who have testified here has wilfully testified falsely as to any material matter, you may reject the entire testimony of that witness, or you may accept such part or portion as commends itself to your belief for which you find corroborated by other evidence in the case.

The law does not compel a defendant in a criminal case to take the witness stand and testify. And no presumption of guilt may be raised and no inference of any kind may be drawn from the failure of a witness to testify.

However, a defendant who wishes to testify may do so and is a competent witness. The defendant's testimony is to be judged in the same way as that of any other witness as I have just described for you.

In this case there has been testimony with regard to the use of a person referred to as an informer or an informant and that was Mary Adler. The services of informant are availed of by the Government and its agents at times to make narcotics purchases and to obtain introductions to persons suspected of violating the narcotics laws so that the agents themselves can make undercover purchases.

Violations of the narcotics laws are the types of crimes where, without the use of informants, detections

would be extremely difficult. The law from time immemorial has permitted the use of informants, provided the rights of a defendant are not violated.

Now, you are not being called upon to determine or say whether you approve or disapprove of the use of informants but as I have indicated, the Government often uses informers in drug cases and there is nothing wrong legally with the use of informers.

So, the use of informers is not to enter into your discussions.

about the Government's failure to call as a witness the informer, Mary Adler. The law is, that if the Government has failed to call a witness who is equally available to both sides, you may not draw an inference that his or her testimon; would have been unfavorable to the Government. There is no presumption against the Government from its failure to call witnesses if it should appear to you that their testimony would be merely cumulative or repetitive and have no greater value than that of witnesses who have testified.

The law does not impose upon a defendant the duty to call any witnesses who are shown to have been present at any of the events involved in the evidence or may

appear to have some knowledge of the matters in question.

Both sides have the right to interview witnesses at any
time before and during the trial. Both sides have the
right to subpoena or request witnesses to appear in court.

I want to tell you about circumstantial evidence because a great deal of the evidence in this case is what we call circumstantial evidence and as you may know, there are two classes of evidence recognized and admitted in courts of justice upon which either an accused may be found guilty of a crime.

One is called direct evidence, the other is called circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence tends to show the fact in issue without need for any other amplification, although, of course, there is always the question whether that evidence is to be believed.

Circumstantial evidence on the other hand tends to show other facts from which the fact in issue may reasonably be inferred. It is that evidence which tends to prove the fact in issue as I have said by proof of other facts which have a legitimate tendency to lead the mind to infer that the facts sought to be established are true.

For instance, it is sometimes difficult to tell when you are on an upper floor in a building like this

whether or not by going over to the window and looking out it is raining, but if you go over to the window and look out into the street below and you see people with their umbrellas up, then you may come to the conclusion that it is raining. You have direct evidence, the evidence of your own senses that the umbrellas are up and that constitutes circumstantial evidence on which you are entitled to conclude that it is raining.

In other words, circumstantial evidence again consists of facts proved from which the jury may infer by a process of reasoning other facts in issue. It is not necessary that the participation of a defendant be shown by direct evidence. The connection may be inferred by such facts and circumstances in evidence as legitimately tend to sustain that inference.

Knowledge and wilfullness and intent of a defendant need not be proved by direct evidence. Like any other fact in issue, it may be established by circumstantial evidence. The significant fact is the defendant's state of mind.

It is obviously impossible to prove directly the operation of a person's mind because you can't look into a person's mind and see what his or her intentions are or were, but the proof of the circumstances surrounding

a defendant's activities may well supply an adequate and convincing basis for finding that the defendant acted knowingly, wilfully and intentionally.

The actions of a person must be put in their time and place just as the full meaning of a word is commonly understood only in its relation to other words in a sentence.

So the meaning of a particular act or conduct of a defendant may depend on the circumstances surrounding that act or conduct.

In determining the issue of intent, you are entitled to consider any statements made by the defendant which are in evidence and acts done by the accused and all facts and circumstances in evidence which may aid you in determining the defendant's state of mind.

You may consider such things as the age, background and experience of a defendant and whether such facts make it likely or unlikely, probable or improbable that a defendant fully and precisely understood what he was doing in relation to a transaction and where relevant, in relation to others.

Now I am going to read the indictment to you and explain what the Government must prove to your satisfactil... beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant can be convicted of the crime charged here.

With respect to the indictment, I want to remind you of what I said at the commencement of the trial and that is, that an indictment is not proof or evidence. It is merely an accusation. It is a technique or method or procedure which we employ in our system whereby one who is accused by a grand jury of a crime is brought into court and then their guilt or innocence is determined by a trial jury or petit jury such as you are.

The indictment reads as follows:

The Grand Jury charges on or about the 18th day of September, 1973 here in the Southern District of New York, Peter Beckerman the defendant unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly did distribute and possess with intent to distribute a Schedule 2 narcotics drug controlled substance, to wit, approximately 28.04 grams of cocaine hydrochloride.

The indictment cites a statute which indicates the law which is violated according to this charge and that is Title 21 United States Code Section 841A1.

That statute provides in pertinent part as follows. It reads:

"It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to distribute or possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance."

Then in another section of the law Title 21 Section

812, it is provided in pertinent part that there are established by that Section 5 schedules of controlled substances. to be known as Schedule 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and such schedules shall initially consist of the substances listed in that schedule.

In Schedule 2, cocaine is listed as a controlled substance and as I said, the indictment charges that Mr. Beckerman violated that statute.

The defendant claims that he is not guilty of the charge made in the indictment because he was entrapped by the Government's agents into committing the crime charged.

In this connection, the defendant claims that he was not involved in the drug traffic. He never sold drugs before, he had no predisposition to commit any such crime and admonished Mary Adler about getting involved with people interested in drugs..

If you find defendant's claim is true, then the fact that he was entrapped will in law excuse his crime and later I will instruct you on the law of entrapment.

Defendant further claims that the Government has failed to establish a necessary element of the crime, and that is, that defendant intended to distribute the cocaine.

Defendant denies that he intended to distribute the cocaine.

4

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

21

25

Now, before you can find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in the indictment, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government has proved each of the four following elements of that crime.

First, thaton or about September 18, 1973, the defendant did possess a controlled substance.

Second, that on or about September 18, 1973 the defendant did intend to distribute the controlled substance.

Third, that the defendant did sell unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly and intentionall.

Four, that the substance which is Government's Exhibit 1 is in fact a controlled substance.

I want to discuss in further detail some of those elements. You will note that the first element of the offense is possession of a controlled substance. What is meant in the law by possession? The law recognizes two kinds of possession. Actual possession and constructive possession. The person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is then in actual possession of it.

A person who though not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and intention at a given

time to exercise dominion and control over a thing either directly or through another person or persons is in constructive possession of it.

The law also recognizes that possession may
be joint or sole. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole.

If two or more persons share actual or constructive
possession of a thing, possession is joint.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that the accused, that is, Mr.

Beckerman, either alone or jointly with others was in actual or constructive possession of the controlled substance which is Government's Exhibit 1, then you may find that such was in the possession of the defendant.

You will note that the second element is that defendant did possess the controlled substance with intent to distribute that controlled substance. The word distribute means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing the narcotic control substance.

The word intent refers to a person's state of mind.

So the term possess with intent to distribute can be fairly stated to mean to control an item with the state of mind or purpose to transfer or deliver that item.

In order to convict a defendant in any criminal

rkrf 82

case, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully.

Now, unlawfully means obviously contrary to law. An act is done knowingly if it is done voluntarily and purposefully and not because of mistake, accident, mere negligence or other innocent reason.

An act is done wilfully if it is done knowingly, deliberately, intentionall and with an evil motive or purpose.

In determining whether a defendant has acted wilfully, it is not necessary for the Government to establish that the defendant knew that he was breaking any particular law or any particular rule, but it must show a bad purpose or motive on the part of the defendant.

As I have said, knowledge and wilfulness and intent of a defendant need not be proved by direct evidence. Like any other fact in issue, it may be established by circumstantial evidence.

Now we come to the fourth and final element.

As to the fourth element, the indictment charges that

the Schedule 2 controlled substance is cocaine hydrochloride.

As you know, there has been a stipulation entered into by the lawyers on both sides to the effect that if a chemist were called to testify, he would testify that

Government's Exhibit 1 in evidence is cocaine as a result of his analysis.

Now, I instruct you as a matter of law that cocaine hydrochloride is a controlled substance as I read it to you or pointed out to you earlier from the statute.

You, however, must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance contained in Government's Exhibit 1 is cocaine hydrochloride.

Now as I pointed out and as you may recall from the evidence and arguments of counsel, a principal issue in this case is whether the defendant intended to distribute the cocaine. If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the cocaine as I have said, then you must next consider the evidence relating to defendant's intentions as to the substance he possessed.

You are instructed again, that with respect to an individual's state of mind, you may rely on circumstantial evidence. This is so because direct proof as to the workings of an individual's mind are ordinarily unavailable and unknow able to other persons because you can't look into a person's mind and see what his or her intentions are or were.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to distribute cocaine, then you must find that the second element has been established.

I want to point out that the statute under which defendant is charged does not require that a sale be consummated, although obviously that would be the strongest proof regarding the intent to distribute. Whereas here, no sale has been established, nor alleged a jury must rely on circumstantial evidence to come to some conclusion regarding the defendant's intent to distribute.

In this regard, it is the Government's claim that you can infer the necessary state of mind of the defendant from the following evidence in the case.

The first is, the defendant's testimony that he got the package from Craig Bryant after Mary Adler called defendant.

Then the Government has pointed to the agent's testimony as to what transpired in Mary Adler's apartment; that he talked to defendant about purchasing cocaine in the future and that the defendant said that he didn't want to break up the package by giving the agent a sample.

Then the Government points to the testimony of the agent that the defendant offered to let the agent test the cocaine in the kitchen.

Then the Government points to the agents' testimony as to defendant's familiarity with the language of the drug trade, specifically, that the cocaine he was offering

could be hit three times in their discussion regarding Chileal.

rock and Brazilian flake or whatever the expressions were.

Defendant, on the other hand, contends that no inference as to his state of mind can be reasonably drawn from this evidence and that it was not his intention to distribute the cocaine.

Defendant points to his testimony that he intended only to take the package back to Craig Bryant, that he urged Mary Adler not to get involved with the man in her apartment, and he points to his testimony that he went to the apartment only to put the people who were harassing Mary Adler out of her apartment.

Now, if you find that the Government has failed to establish any one of the four essential elements which I have just enumerated and discussed for you in detail beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must acquit this defendant.

If, on the other hand, you find that the Government has established each and every one of these essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may find the defendant guilty.

As I told you, I want to instruct you on the law of entrapment because that is a special legal defense which will excuse the commission of a crime.

As you know, the defendant here asserts as a defense to the charge that he was a victim of entrapment by a Government agent, that is, Mary Adler and the other agents.

The word entrapment as I have said has a legal meaning, a technical meaning, and it does not have the meaning of popular speech or colloquial ordinary usage.

Therefore I must explain the meaning of entrapment as that term is used in law.

criminal activity is such that sometimes stealth and strategy are necessary methods to be used by law enforcement officers. The function of law enforcement is not only the prevention of crime, but also the detection and apprehension of criminals.

Now, manifestly that function does not include the manufacturing of crime by Government agents. The defense of entrapment is based upon the policy of the law not to ensure or entrap innocent persons into commission of a crime, but a line must be drawn between the entrapment of the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.

A basic feature of entrapment is, that the idea or design of committing the crime originated with the law enforcement officer or Government informer rather than with the defendant.

Putting it another way, in entrapment, it must be shown that the defendant has no previous disposition, intent or purpose to commit the alleged crime and that the law enforcement office or Government employee implanted in the mind of an innocent person, the disposition to commit the alleged offense and instigated and incited its commission in order that the defendant might be arrested and prosecuted.

If you find that an agent or employee of the Government merely afforded a favorable opportunity to a defendant for the commission of the alleged crime, such conduct on the part of the Government does not constitute entrapment.

Entrapment would occur only if you find that the Government agent induced the defendant to commit the crime charged in the indictment and that the criminal conduct of the defendant was the product of Government activity.

If the jury finds any credible evidence creating the reasonable possibility that a Government agent or employee instigated and incited or otherwise induced the defendant to commit the crime charged, then the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such inducement was not the cause or the creator of the crime. That is

In other words, expressing the same thought, while a defendant is not required to prove his entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, the Government must prove its absence beyond a reasonable doubt and if you have a reasonable doubt as to the absence of entrapment and find a reasonable possibility of entrapment, you must acquit the defendant.

If the prosecution has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was ready and willing to commit the offense charged and was merely awaiting a favorable opportunity to commit the offense, then you may find that the inducement if any which brought about the actual offense was no more than the providing of what appeared to the defendant to be a favorable or timely or convenient opening for the criminal activity in which the defendant engaged.

In such circumstances, you may find that the Government's agent has not seduced an innocent person, but has only provided the means for the defendant to effectuate or realize his own then existing purpose.

The jury is not to consider or in any way speculated about the punishment which a defendant may receive if found

guilty. The function of a jury is to determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant on the basis of the evidence and the Court's instructions. It is for the Judge alone or the Court has the duty of determining the sentence if there is a conviction.

The most important part of this case, ladies and gentlemen, is the part which you are now about to play, because as I have said, it is four you and you alone to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.

I know you will try the issues that have been presented to you according to the oath which you have taken as jurors and in that oath, you promised that you would well and truly try the issues joined in this case and a true verdict render.

I suggest to you that if you follow that oath and try the issues without combining your thinking with any emotions, you will arrive at a true and just verdict.

It must be clear to you, once you get into an emotional state and let bias or sympathy or prejudice interfere with your thinking, then you will not arrive at a true and just verdict. As you deliberate, ladies and gentlemen, please be careful to listen to the opinions of your fellow jurors and ask for an opportunity to express your own views. No one juror holds center stage

rkrf 90

in a jury room. No one juror controls or monopolizes the deliberations.

If after listening to your fellow jurors and if after stating your own view you become convinced that your view is wrong, do not hesitate because of stubbornness or pride of opinion to change your view.

On the other hand, do not surrender your honest conviction solely because you are outnumbered.

As I have said, your verdict must be unanimous.

It must represent the absolute conviction of each one of you.

Will counsel approach the bench?

(In the robing room.)

THE COURT: Do you have any exceptions to the charge?

MR. CAREY: I have no exceptions. I have two things to mention. If your, Honor charged presumption of innocence, I didn't catch it.

THE COURT: What do you mean?

MR. POLSTEIN: She did.

THE COURT: I always do it at the beginning. That he is presumed innocent?

MR. CAREY: I just wanted to be sure it was instructed.

THE COURT: The Court denies the motion for the following reasons: First, this was a very short trial. The Government called two witnesses whose testimony consumed only a few hours.

MR. CAREY: Your Honor, I believe the Government called three witnesses.

THE COURT: All right. The Government called three witnesses, whose testimony consumed only a few hours. The defendant called four witnesses, and the reporter indicates that he can supply for the record the exact amount of time involved.

MR. NAFTALIS: I think it was four in addition to the defendant, your Honor, so it was a total of five.

THE COURT: A total of five? In any event, they were all short witnesses. As the record discloses, the trial started at about 3 -- what time was it on the 8th?

MR. NAFTALIS: Your Honor, the trial started at 11 o'clock. The jury was picked by the afternoon, so 3:15 would be the time the jury was selected and opening statements would begin.

THE COURT: In any event, it is not disputed that id was a very short trial. Secondly, it was a cone-count indictment involving a single defendant. Thirdly, the defense here
was entrapment, which means that the defendant admitted the

charge but claimed simply that he had been entrapped by a Government witness.

The jury during the course of its deliberations asked to have the charge on entrapment re-read, which the Court re-read. It asked to have the Court's charge with respect to failure to call a witness re-read, where there was a question directed to that problem, and the Court re-read that. The jury also asked that certain testimony be read, which was read.

The jury went out at 2:35 in the afternoon, recessed for dinner for about an hour and a half and then at 9:15 sent out a note saying that the jury was deadlocked. Each time the Court received a note from the jurors, the lawyers were called in and the note was discussed before the jury was brought in to get the lawyers' views.

In this instance, when the note was sent out by the jury, the Court called the lawyers again and told them what the note said. The Government objected, defense counsel did not object. From that the Court construed the defendant's silence as agreement with the Court that enough time had passed.

The Court called in the jurors and asked the forelady whether she thought with additional time the jury could reach a verdict. Of course, the forelady improperly began to tell the Court about the deliberations; that is, it is the

(Court adjourned.)

Thank you.

Court's recollection that the forelady said, "Some of the jurous are of the view that they didn't have enough evidence."

The Court then put the question again to the forelady with respect to whether she thought with additional time they could reach a verdict, and the forelady replied, "The way it seems now, it doesn't seem as though we will be able to.)"

In addition, no member of the jury suggested that additional time would result in a verdict in that case. Of course, they were all present when I twice put the question to the forelady.

So I think that in view of all the circumstances in the case, the jury was properly discharged in this case and a mistrial declared.

As I have indicated, the reporter has agreed to supply the exact time that the trial took. It is my recollection that the opening statements were very brief and the record discloses that the closing statements were fairly brief, and the testimony, as I indicated, on the part of the Government took a matter of a few hours and the same with respect to the five — if there were five — defense witnesses. But the reporter can supply that, the exact time, in connection with this oral opinion and it will become a part of the record.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-against-

73 CR. 939

PETER BECKERMAN,

Defendant.

ORDER

For all the reasons stated on the record at the hearing held on September 27, 1974, defendant's posttrial motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it violates his Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy, is denied.

Dated: New York, New York

October 23, 1974

SO ORDERED

U. S. D. J.

Attorney for A PARLLIA